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Abstract
Galeotti et al. (2006, [2]) show that all minimal networks can be strict Nash in
two-way ﬂow models with full parameter heterogeneity while only inward pointing
stars and the empty network can be strict Nash in the homogeneous parameter
model of Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]). In this note we show that the introduction
of partner heterogeneity plays a major role in substantially increasing the set of
strict Nash equilibria.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, D85
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11 Introduction
In their seminal paper on Nash networks with homogeneous players, Bala and Goyal
(2000, [1]) ﬁnd that in the two-way ﬂow model the equilibrium set is very small. In
particular they show that only the empty network and the inward pointing star (a
star network where the central agent forms all the links) can be strict Nash networks.
Galeotti et al. (2006, [2]) introduce heterogeneity in this model by allowing costs and
beneﬁts of links to depend on the identity of the player who is forming the links and
acquiring information. Hence player i always gets the same information Vi from the
other players and pays a cost ci for all her links. Under this type of heterogeneity, which
we call player heterogeneity, they ﬁnd no change in the set of strict Nash networks.
Subsequently, they introduce full heterogeneity in values by making them dependent on
the link, i.e., player i gets value Vij from player j, and ﬁnd that strict Nash networks
can have components, but each such component is still an inward pointing star. When
they additionally introduce full cost heterogeneity, i.e., allow costs to depend on the
link as well (denoted by cij), they ﬁnd that the set of strict Nash networks increases
dramatically. All strict Nash networks are now minimal networks, that is networks with
components where the deletion of any link increases the number of components.
In this paper, we ask whether the introduction of full heterogeneity of players is
the only way to destabilize the Bala and Goyal’s results. To answer this question, we
allow heterogeneity to be partner dependent, that is the value acquired from player j
is Vj for all players, and the costs of linking to player i’s partner player j are cj. In
practice, such situations where accessing diﬀerent agents involves diﬀerent costs and
yields diﬀerent beneﬁts of course arise quite frequently. We show that this type of
heterogeneity substantially increases the set of equilibrium networks and thus is the
driving force behind the increase in the size of strict Nash networks in models with
2heterogeneity. In other words, it is not necessary to have two degrees of freedom in the
cost parameter cij to destabilize the results of the homogeneous case. One degree of
freedom in values and costs, provided it is partner and not player dependent, can lead
to a larger set of strict Nash networks.
2 Model setup
Let N = {1,...,n} be the set of players. Each player i chooses a strategy gi =
(gi,1,...,gi,i−1,gi,i+1,gi,n) where gi,j ∈ {0,1} for all j ∈ N \ {i}. The interpreta-
tion of gi,j = 1 is that player i forms a link with player j  = i, and the interpretation of
gi,j = 0 is that i forms no link with player j. By convention, we assume that player i
cannot form a link with herself. In the following we only use pure strategies. Let Gi be
the set of all strategies of player i ∈ N. Network relations among players are formally
represented by directed networks whose nodes are identiﬁed with the players.
A network g = (N,E) is a pair of sets: the set N of players and the set E ⊂ N ×N
of directed links. In the following, we denote by E(g) the set of links of network g. A
link from j to i is denoted by j,i. A network g is transitive if i,j ∈ E(g) whenever
both i,k ∈ E(g) and k,j ∈ E(g). A network g which satisﬁes a property, say p1, is
minimal if there does not exist a network g′ such that E(g′) ( E(g) and g′ satisﬁes p1.
The transitive closure of a network g is the minimal transitive network containing g.
A network g is symmetric if i,j ∈ E(g) implies j,i ∈ E(g). The symmetrized network
associated with network g is the minimal symmetric network which contains g. Let G
be the set of all simple directed networks. Let f : G → G, g  → f(g) be a mapping which
associates with network g the transitive closure of g. Let h : G → G, g  → h(g) be a
mapping which associates with network g the symmetrized network of g. Let ˙ g = f(g),
3¯ g = h(g), and the composition be ˆ g = f ◦ h(g).
Deﬁne Ni(g) = {i and j ∈ N \ {i} | ˆ gi,j = 1} as the set of players who are observed
by player i with the convention that player i always “observes” himself. We assume
that values and costs are partner heterogeneous. More precisely, each player i obtains
Vj > 0 from each player j ∈ Ni(g) \ {i}, and incurs a cost cj > 0 when she forms a link
with player j  = i. Also since we wish to focus only on the network formed, we assume
that player i obtains resources of other players j  = i, but no additional resources from
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Given the properties we have assumed for the function φ, the ﬁrst term can be interpreted
as the “beneﬁts” that agent i receives from her links, while
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We now introduce the set of players who have the minimal cost of setting links, Si0 =
{j ∈ N | j ∈ argminj∈N{cj}}, with i0 as a typical member of the set Si0. Let si0 be the
cardinality of the set Si0. Finally, let H = {j ∈ N | cj < Vj} be the set of players whose
value is greater than the cost of linking to them.
Network Deﬁnitions. We now provide some network deﬁnitions that are used in
this note.1 For a directed graph, g ∈ G, a path Pj,i(g) of length m in g from players j
1Almost all these deﬁnitions come from Harary, Norman and Cartwright (1965, [3]), sometimes with
4to player i, i  = j, is a ﬁnite sequence i0,i1,...,im of distinct players such that i0 = i,
im = j and gik,ik+1 = 1 for k = 0,...,m − 1. A chain Ci,j(g) in g between player j
and player i, i  = j, is a ﬁnite sequence i0,i1,...,im of distinct players such that i0 = i,
im = j and max{gik,ik+1,gik+1,ik} = 1 for k = 0,...,m − 1. Let us denote by Ci,j(g) the
set of all chains between i and j in g. The length of a chain Ci,j(g) between i and j in
g is denoted by ℓ(Ci,j(g)), and consists in the number of links between player i and j in
Ci,j(g). Let dg(i,j) = argminCi,j(g)∈Ci,j{ℓ(Ci,j(g))} be the geodesic distance between i
and j in g. The diameter of a network g is deﬁned as maxi∈N,j∈N{dg(i,j)}. A network
is connected if ˆ gi,j = 1 for all i ∈ N and j ∈ N \ {i}. Let us denote by Gmc the set of
minimally connected networks. Given a network g, we deﬁne a component as a network
g′ such that E(g′) ⊂ E(g) and E(g′) ⊂ D × D with D ⊂ N such that for all players
i ∈ D and j ∈ D \ {i} we have ˆ gi,j = 1, and for all i ∈ D and j  ∈ D we have ˆ gi,j = 0.
Various kinds of architectures play a role in this note. The empty network ge, is a
network such that for all i ∈ N,j ∈ N \ {i}, we have ge
i,j = 0. A network g is a star if
there is a player i such that ¯ gi,j = 1 for all j ∈ N \ {i} and ¯ gℓ,j = 0 for all ℓ ∈ N \ {i}
and j ∈ N \ {i,ℓ}. The network g is an inward pointing star if it is a star and for the
center player i, we have gi,j = 1 for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
Let Qi(g) = {i and j ∈ N \{i} | ˙ gi,j = 1} be the set of players which contains player
i and players j ∈ N \ {i} such that there exists a path from player j to player i. This
set can be extended to a set of points N′ ⊂ N: QN′(g) = {i ∈ N′ and j ∈ N \ N′ |
∃(i,j) ∈ N′ × N \ N′, ˙ gi,j = 1}. A point contrabasis of a network g, B(g), is a minimal
set (for the inclusion relation ⊂) of players such that QB(g) = N. An i-point contrabasis,
Bi(g), is a point contrabasis of g such that all players j ∈ Bi(g) satisfy gj,i = 1. Let
Ii(g) = {j ∈ N | gj,i = 1} be the set of players who form a link with player i in g.
slight modiﬁcations.
5Recall that i0 is a typical member of Si0. A Bi0-network is a network which satisﬁes
the following properties: |Ii0(g)| ≥ 2, |Ij(g)| < 2 for all j  = i0, and Ii0(g) = Bi0(g). In
such a network, there is only one player (the minimal cost player) with whom at least
two players have formed a link, and this forms a point contrabasis of the network. We
know from Harary, Norman, Cartwright that every network has a point contrabasis (see
Corollary, [3] 4.2a’, p.93). A network g is a con-tree (converse tree) if it is minimally
connected and contains a unique player i ∈ N such that for all players j ∈ N \ {i},
there is a path from j to i in g. It is clear that the point contrabasis of a con-tree is a
singleton.
Nash Networks and Strict Nash Networks. Given a network g ∈ G, let g−i
denote the network obtained when all of player i’s links are removed. The network g
can be written as g = gi ⊕ g−i where ‘⊕’ indicates that g is formed as the union of the
links of gi and g−i. Likewise if we write g = g′ ⊖ g′′, then g is the diﬀerence between
the links of g′ and g′′. The strategy gi is said to be a best response of player i to the
network g−i if:
πi(gi ⊕ g−i) ≥ πi(g
′




The set of all of player i’s best responses to g−i is denoted by BRi(g−i). A network g
is said to be a Nash network if gi ∈ BRi(g−i) for each player i ∈ N. We deﬁne a strict
best response and a strict Nash network by replacing ‘≥’ with ‘>’.
3 Characterization of strict Nash networks
We start with a preliminary result that is stated without proof. The proof is similar to
one found in many network papers (see for instance Galeotti et al. [2]).
6Lemma 1 Suppose the payoﬀ function satisﬁes equation (1). A non empty strict Nash
network g is minimally connected.
We know from Bala and Goyal (2000, [1], Proposition 4.2) that a non empty strict
Nash network g in the homogeneous case (Vj = V and cj = c, for all j ∈ N) is such
that |B(g)| = 1. Also from Galeotti et al. (adaptation of proposition 3.1, 2006, [2]),
we know that in the player heterogeneity model with linear payoﬀs, a non empty strict
Nash network g is such that |B(g)| = 1. Indeed, in both cases, the inward pointing
star is the unique non empty strict Nash network. However, the introduction of partner
heterogeneity dramatically increases the set of strict Nash networks. In the following
proposition we characterize the architecture of these networks. To establish our ﬁrst
proposition, we recall a result of digraph theory.
Theorem 1 (Harary, Norman, Cartwright (1965, [3], Theorem 4.3’, p.93) Every
minimally connected network has a unique point contrabasis.
Proposition 1 Suppose the payoﬀ function satisﬁes equation (1). A non empty strict
Nash network g is either a minimally connected Bi0-network or a con-tree.
Suppose the payoﬀ function satisﬁes equation (2). There exist parameters (cj)j∈N,
(Vj)j∈N, such that any minimally connected Bi0-network and any con-tree are strict
Nash networks.
Proof See Appendix. ￿










This payoﬀ function captures situations where values are fully heterogeneous while costs
are partner heterogeneous. Using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1
7it can be shown that equilibrium networks are not always connected: they contain some
components. Moreover, if we denote by iD the minimal cost player of the component
D, then components of equilibrium networks are either BiD-networks, or con-trees.
We now examine the relationship between the set of strict Nash networks in the
homogeneous model and the partner heterogeneity model. For the sake of exposition,
we focus on the linear case.
Remark 1 Homogeneous model (Bala and Goyal (2000, [1]) vs Partner Heterogeneity
model. Recall that inward pointing stars are the unique strict Nash networks in the
linear homogeneous model, when V > c. In the partner heterogeneity linear model, it
is always possible to form a network of diameter strictly greater than 2 if H = N, and
there is at least one player who has a link cost diﬀerent from the others. This is easy to
show.
Let there be only one player, say i, whose cost is diﬀerent from the cost of other
players. Then, there are two possibilities: either player i is the lowest cost player, or
i is the highest cost player. First, let i be the lowest cost player. Then, for a network
g if there exist two players, j ∈ N \ {i} and k ∈ N \ {i,j}, such that gj,ℓ = 1 for all
ℓ ∈ N \ {j,k}, gi,k = 1, and there exist no other links, then g is a strict Nash network.
Second, let player i be the highest cost player. If there exist two players j  = i and k  = i
in g such that gj,ℓ = 1 for all ℓ ∈ N \ {i,j}, gk,i = 1, and there exist no other links,
then g is a strict Nash network.
Thus, the result of the homogeneous case cannot be found in the partner heterogene-
ity model. This sharply contrasts with what we ﬁnd in the player heterogeneity model.
This is true even if only one agent has costs diﬀerent from others and this diﬀerence
is very low. Consequently, it is not possible to use continuity arguments to study the
set of strict Nash networks of partner heterogeneity model from the set of strict Nash
8networks of homogeneous model.
Let us denote by ¯ Gmc the set of symmetrized minimally connected networks and by
Gct the set of networks which are con-trees. We now present a result which allows us to
study the relationship between the set of strict Nash networks according to the type of
heterogeneity.
Proposition 2 Suppose the payoﬀ function satisﬁes equation (1). We have h(Gct) =
¯ Gmc.
Proof It is straightforward that Gmc ⊃ Gct. We now show that ¯ Gmc ⊂ h(Gct). Let
g ∈ ¯ G. We will show that g is a symmetrized network of a network g′ ∈ Gct. Let
N′ = {i ∈ N | i ∈ argminj∈N{| Ij(g) |}}. We choose one player, say i′, in N′. For
all players i ∈ N \ {i′} such that max{gi′,i,gi,i′} = 1, we let g′
i′,i = 1. Likewise for all
players j ∈ N\{i′} and k ∈ N\{i′,j}, who belong to the same chain Ci′,ℓ(g), we impose
the following rule: If gk,j = gj,k = 1 and dg(i′,j) < dg(i′,k), then we have g′
j,k = 1 and
g′
k,j = 0. It is clear that with this rule, we obtain from any network g ∈ ¯ Gmc a network
g′ which is a con-tree. ￿
Proposition 2 stresses that every minimally symmetrized connected network can
emerge from strict Nash networks in the partner heterogeneity model. Using similar
arguments, we can show that if the payoﬀ function of each player i is πV
i , then every
minimally symmetrized network can emerge from strict Nash networks in the model.
Moreover, we know from Galeotti et al. (2006, [2], Proposition 3.2) that in the model
with full heterogeneity a strict Nash network is a minimal network. In the following
remark, we study the role of heterogeneity for the set of strict Nash networks. To
simplify our analysis, we focus on the linear case.
9Remark 2 Set of potential strict Nash networks: The role of heterogeneity. From
Propositions 1 and 2 in the current paper and Propositions 3.1 and 3.2 due to Galeotti
et al. 2006, [2] we can establish the following facts.
1. The set of strict Nash networks in the partner heterogeneity model allows for more
architectures than the empty network and the inward pointing stars found in the
homogeneous and player heterogeneous models. In other words, even one degree
of freedom (Vj,cj) is suﬃcient to obtain a set of strict Nash networks which is quite
large.
2. To obtain a non connected network as a non empty strict Nash network it is
necessary to introduce two degrees of freedom (Vij,cij) in values or costs.
3. By Proposition 2, it is clear that the two degrees of freedom in costs (cij) only
help relax the constraints on the direction of links of potential strict Nash net-
works. Indeed, the model with payoﬀ function πV
i , allows for the same set of
potential strict Nash architectures as the full heterogeneity model, provided the
direction of links is not taken into account. Moreover, potential strict Nash con-
nected networks have very similar properties (when considering player centrality
or average distance between players) in the partner dependency model and the full
heterogeneity model.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that while the introduction of partner heterogeneity leads to a richer
set of strict Nash architectures than player heterogeneity, this class is not quite as large
as the equilibrium set under full heterogeneity in values and costs. However, from the
10point of view of network properties, sets of strict Nash connected architectures found
in full heterogeneity model and in partner heterogeneity model are quite similar, and
are very diﬀerent from the set of strict Nash architectures found in player heterogeneity
model. In this sense the introduction of the heterogeneity associated with the partner
is responsible for the dramatic change in results when we go from the homogeneous or
player dependency model to the full heterogeneity model.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. First, we show that if the payoﬀ function satisﬁes equa-
tion (1), then a non empty strict Nash network g is either a minimally connected Bi0-
network or a con-tree. From Lemma 1, we know that a non empty strict Nash network
g is minimally connected, we begin the proof with three additional properties of g.
1. If there are two players k and ℓ such that gk,i = gℓ,i = 1, then there does not
exist player j such that max{gj,k,gj,ℓ} = 1. Indeed, since gk,i = gℓ,i = 1, we have
Nk(g) = Nℓ(g) and ci < min{cℓ,ck} otherwise either player k or player ℓ is not
playing a strict best response. The assertion about j follows from this.
2. If there are three players i, j and k such that gi,j = gk,i = 1, then gj′,j = 0 for all
j′ ∈ N \ {i,j}. Again, it is clear that Ni(g) = Nj(g) and ci < cj otherwise player
k has an incentive to form a link with player j to play a strict best response. It
follows that if player j′ ∈ N \ {i,j} forms a link with player j, then she is not
playing a strict best response.
3. If there exists a player i, in a strict Nash network g, such that |Ii(g)| ≥ 2, then
si0 = 1 and player i is i0. To show this assume that there are two players i and
11j such that |Ii(g)| ≥ 2 and |Ij(g)| ≥ 2. Then there are players ki ∈ N, k′
i ∈ N
and kj ∈ N, k′
j ∈ N such that gki,i = gk′
i,i = 1 and gkj,j = gk′
j,j = 1. Since g is
minimally connected it follows that either i ∈ Nj(g ⊖ i,ki) or i ∈ Nj(g ⊖ i,k′
i).
Likewise, we have either j ∈ Ni(g ⊖ j,kj) or j ∈ Ni(g ⊖ j,k′
j). Without loss of
generality, we assume that i ∈ Nj(g ⊖ i,ki) and j ∈ Ni(g ⊖ j,kj). Clearly if ki
deletes her link with i and forms a link with player j, then she obtains the same
resources as in the network g. It follows that ci < cj, otherwise g is not a strict
Nash network. Using a similar argument for player kj it follows that cj < ci,
otherwise g is not a strict Nash network. A contradiction.
Next assume that there is a player i  ∈ Si0 such that |Ii(g)| ≥ 2, and let ki ∈ N,
k′
i ∈ N such that gki,i = gk′
i,i = 1. It is obvious that ki  ∈ Si0 and k′
i  ∈ Si0. By
minimality of g, we have either i ∈ Ni0(g⊖i,ki) or i ∈ Ni0(g⊖i,k′
i). Without loss
of generality, assume that i ∈ Ni0(g ⊖i,ki). It follows that if player ki deletes her
link with i and forms a link with i0, she obtains the same resources as in g. Since
ci0 < ci, g is not a strict Nash network, a contradiction. Finally, if si0 > 1, then
we use the same kind of arguments to show that g is not a strict Nash network.
Suppose that si0 > 1. We know that a non empty strict Nash network g is minimally
connected. From points 1, 2 and 3, it is clear that g is a con-tree. Suppose now that
si0 = 1. Recall that B(g) is the point contrabasis of network g. It is straightforward that
if |B(g)| = 1, then strict Nashnetworks are con-trees. We now show that if |B(g)| > 1,
then strict Nashnetworks are Bi0-networks. We know from point 3 that at most one
player, i0, is such that |Ii0(g)| ≥ 2 and from Theorem 1 we know that there is a unique
point contrabasis in g. Assume now that there is a player i ∈ B(g) \ Ii0(g). It means
that there is no player j such that gj,i = 1 otherwise B(g) is not minimal. It follows that
player i has formed a link with a player j, which allows her to obtain resources of i0 (oth-
12erwise g is not minimally connected). Therefore, if player i replaces her link with j by a
link with player i0 she obtains the same resources and since g is a strict Nash network,
we must have cj < ci0, a contradiction. So, we have B(g) ⊂ Ii0(g). Since |B(g)| > 1
and B(g) ⊂ Ii0(g), we have |Ii0(g)| > 1. In that case, we know by Point 1 that there
is no player who has formed a link with ℓ ∈ Ii0(g). It follows that for all ℓ ∈ Ii0(g),
we have ℓ ∈ B(g) and B(g) ⊃ Ii0(g). As a result, strict Nash networks are Bi0-networks.
Second, we show that if the payoﬀ function satisﬁes equation (2), then there exist
parameters (cj)j∈N, (Vj)j∈N, such that any minimally connected Bi0-network and any
con-tree are strict Nash networks.
Consider a minimally connected Bi0-network g. Denote by P
i0
j,i(g) a path from player
j to player i through player i0 and denote by P
−i0
j,i (g) a path from player j to player
i which does not contain player i0. Let H = N. If there is a path from player i1 to
im, P
−i0
i1,im(g), which consists of the following sequence of players: i1,i2,...,im−1,im in
g, then cik > cik+1 for all k ∈ {1,...,m − 1}. Finally, assume that if there is a path
P
i0
i1,im(g) = {i1,i2,i3 ...,im−1,i0,im} in g, then cik > ck+1 for all k ∈ {1,...,m − 1}.
Recall that by deﬁnition, in a minimally connected Bi0-network no player forms a link
with j ∈ Bi0(g) and only players who belong to Bi0(g) form a link with i0.
Since g is minimally connected and Vj > cj for all players j ∈ N, no player has an
incentive to delete a link with a player j ∈ N in g if she does not replace this link by
another link. We show that no player j ∈ N can replace a link in g and preserve her
payoﬀ. Clearly, if player ik ∈ P
−i0
i1,im(g) chooses to replace the link ik−1,ik, then in order
to access to the same amount of resources as before, she must form a link with a player
ik′ ∈ P
−i0
i1,im(g) with k′ < k − 1, since Nik(g ⊖ ik+1,ik ⊕ ik′,ik) = Nk(g) in a minimally
connected Bi0-network. However, since cik′ > cik−1 for all k′ < k − 1, player k has no
13incentive to replace one of her links. Likewise, if ik ∈ P
i0
i1,im(g) and ik  ∈ Bi0(g), then we
use the same argument as before to show that player ik has no incentive to delete or to
replace one of her links. Finally, if ik ∈ P
i0
i1,im(g) and ik ∈ Bi0(g), then player ik has no
incentive to replace her link with i0, since ci0 < cj for all j ∈ N \ {i0}.
By using similar arguments, it is obvious that there exist (cj)j∈N and (Vj)j∈N such
that any con-tree can be a strict Nash network. ￿
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